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Abstract  This  study  analyses  the  impact  of  family  control  on  decisions  regarding  the  special-
ization and  diversiﬁcation  of  large  business  groups  whose  parent  companies  are  listed  on  Spanish
stock exchanges.  Using  a  sample  of  ninety-nine  companies,  having  identiﬁed  the  companies  that
constitute the  business  group,  and  using  both  binary  logistic  models  and  the  Heckman  two-step
method to  eliminate  selection  bias,  the  results  show  how  the  familial  nature  of  the  parent
company favours  specialization  and  reduces  the  level  of  the  business  group’s  diversiﬁcation.  In
addition,  we  see  that  there  are  differences  among  family  groups  with  respect  to  the  concentra-
tion of  their  holdings  in  that  a  higher  level  of  concentration  increases  the  level  of  diversiﬁcationSpecialization;
Diversiﬁcation
in the  family  business  group.
© 2015  ACEDE.  Published  by  Elsevier  España,  S.L.U.  This  is  an  open  access  article  under  the  CC
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Introduction
Among  the  categories  of  recent  company  owners,  fami-
lies  stand  out  as  one  of  the  most  signiﬁcant  controlling
groups  (La  Porta  et  al.,  1999;  Zahra  and  Sharma,  2004).
The  family  nature  of  a  business  has  an  inﬂuence  on  the
company’s  strategic  behaviour  and  thus  on  the  strategy  of
diversiﬁcation,  given  that  family  members  not  only  pur-
sue  the  fulﬁlment  of  ﬁnancial  goals  but  also  work  for  both∗ Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: alex@unizar.es (A. Hernández-Trasobares),
cgalve@unizar.es (C. Galve-Górriz).
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http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.brq.2015.09.001
2340-9436/© 2015 ACEDE. Published by Elsevier España, S.L.U. Th
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).vecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
he  survival  and  continuity  of  the  family  business  (Arregle
t  al.,  2007)  and  the  preservation  of  socio-emotional  wealth
Gomez-Mejia  et  al.,  2007,  2010).
Most  of  the  literature  related  to  the  inﬂuence  of  a
usiness’s  familial  nature  on  diversiﬁcation  corresponds
o  studies  performed  in  the  United  States  (Kang,  1999;
nderson  and  Reeb,  2003;  Gomez-Mejia  et  al.,  2010;  Miller
t  al.,  2010),  with  fewer  studies  in  the  European  (Ducassy
nd  Prevot,  2010;  Mun˜oz-Bullón  and  Sánchez-Bueno,  2011)
nd  Asian  contexts  (Chen  and  Yu,  2011).  However,  the  results
btained  in  these  studies  are  not  consistent  (Kang,  1999;
nderson  and  Reeb,  2003;  Ducassy  and  Prevot,  2010;  Gomez-
ejia  et  al.,  2010;  Chen  and  Yu,  2011).  These  discrepancies
re  possibly  due  to  differences  in  how  diversiﬁcation  is
is is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
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eﬁned  in  the  studies’  measures  and  methodologies  (Benito-
sorio  et  al.,  2012)  and/or  to  differences  in  the  inﬂuence  of
he  institutional  settings  of  the  countries  where  the  studies
ere  conducted  (Peng,  2003).
Conversely,  there  has  been  considerable  analysis  of  the
irect  inﬂuence  of  the  concentration  of  holdings  on  diversiﬁ-
ation,  using  agency  theory  as  a  point  of  reference  (Amihud
nd  Lev,  1999;  Lane  et  al.,  1999).  An  increase  in  holdings
oncentration  gives  rise  to  a  reduction  in  the  level  of  diver-
iﬁcation  by  reducing  the  principal-agent  agency  problem
Amihud  and  Lev,  1981;  Berger  and  Ofek,  1995;  Goranova
t  al.,  2007).  Nevertheless,  when  the  degree  of  concentra-
ion  of  holdings  is  high,  a  principal--principal  agency  problem
an  arise  (majority  stockholder--minority  stockholder).  This
roblem  can  prompt  the  controlling  shareholder  to  imple-
ent  a  strategy  of  greater  diversiﬁcation  to  maximize  his
r  her  own  proﬁt  and/or  reduce  to  his  or  her  personal  risk
based  on  his  or  her  increased  participation  in  the  capital  of
he  company)  and  to  decline  to  participate  in  diversiﬁcation
ntended  to  maximize  the  value  of  the  business  (seeking  syn-
rgies  in  sales,  costs,  or  risks  among  the  various  businesses
nd/or  activities  resulting  from  diversiﬁcation)  (Fama  and
ensen,  1983;  La  Porta  et  al.,  1999;  Lins  and  Servaes,  2002).
t  would  be  appropriate  to  translate  this  evidence  to  the
et  of  family  companies,  proposing  the  following  questions:
an  concentration  of  holdings  have  a  moderating  effect  on
he  relationship  between  the  familial  nature  of  a business
nd  diversiﬁcation?  In  other  words,  do  family  businesses  with
igher  levels  of  concentration  of  holdings  differ  from  fam-
ly  businesses  with  lower  levels  of  concentration  of  holdings
ith  respect  to  diversiﬁcation?
This  study  intends  to  answer  the  questions  posed  above
y  proposing  a  double  objective:  ﬁrst,  to  analyse  the  impact
f  family  control  on  the  diversiﬁcation1 of  large  business
roups  whose  parent  company  is  listed  on  Spanish  stock
xchanges;  and  second,  to  analyse  the  moderating  effect
f  the  concentration  of  holdings  on  the  inﬂuence  of  family
ontrol  on  diversiﬁcation.  To  establish  this  study’s  hypoth-
sis,  we  begin  by  discussing  the  contributions  of  agency
heory  (Jensen  and  Meckling,  1976;  Fama  and  Jensen,  1983)
nd  then  complement  that  discussion  with  the  concept  of
ocio-emotional  wealth  (Gomez-Mejia  et  al.,  2007,  2010).
he  nature  of  the  shareholder  who  controls  the  group  of
usinesses  can  affect  the  diversiﬁcation  strategies  that  are
dopted,  both  through  differences  in  the  goals  that  are  pur-
ued  and  through  agency  costs  arising  out  of  contracts  that
eek  either  to  maintain  the  cohesion  of  the  group  or  to
egulate  conﬂicts.  More  speciﬁcally,  the  family  will  adopt
trategies  that  allow  it  optimize  performance,  always  sub-
ect  to  the  restriction  of  maintaining  management  control
nd  the  allocation  of  company  resources  in  family  hands.In  addition  to  the  considerations  presented  above,  the
tudy  is  justiﬁed  for  the  following  reasons.  First,  and  unlike
ost  previous  studies  that  use  the  company’s  diversiﬁcation
1 The concept of diversiﬁcation used refers to product diversiﬁca-
ion. Conversely, when speaking of low levels of diversiﬁcation, the
erm implicitly refers to the strategy of specialisation of activities
Palich et al., 2000), that is, a strategy in which a company opts to
arry out a single activity or alternatively, where a large part of a
ompany’s income is derived from a single business (Rumelt, 1982).
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tself  as  the  unit  of  analysis,2 our  study  of  diversiﬁcation
ses  the  pyramidal  group  of  independent  businesses  con-
rolled  by  the  same  parent  company  (i.e.,  a  group’s  head
ompany)  as  the  unit  of  analysis.  This  unit  of  analysis  allows
or  better  identiﬁcation  of  the  corporate  strategy  adopted
y  the  parent  company  because  it  incorporates  the  activities
eveloped  by  dependent  companies,  avoiding  the  omission
f  important  activities  because  exclusively  considering  the
arent  company’s  activities  can  give  a  distorted  vision  of  the
ompany’s  corporate  strategy.
Second,  the  study  provides  new  evidence  for  the  case  of
pain  with  respect  to  the  inﬂuence  of  the  familial  nature
f  the  controlling  shareholder  on  strategies  of  the  special-
zation  and  diversiﬁcation  of  large  business  groups  whose
arent  company  is  listed  on  an  exchange.  More  speciﬁcally,
he  study  compares  family  and  non-family  groups  of  busi-
esses,  considering  the  possible  moderating  effect  of  the
oncentration  of  holdings.
Third,  the  study  contributes  to  the  literature  by  analysing
 government  and  regulatory  setting  distinct  from  the  Amer-
can  institutional  context.  Spain  is  characterized  by  its
embership  in  a  legal  system  based  on  civil  law,  which
as  an  institutional  and  regulatory  framework  to  protect
inority  stockholders  that  is  weaker  than  the  institutional
ramework  of  the  United  States  and  the  United  Kingdom  (La
orta  et  al.,  1999),  which  explains  Spain’s  greater  concen-
ration  of  company  holdings  in  general  and  its  greater
oncentration  of  holdings  in  family  businesses  in  particular.
To  achieve  this  goal,  the  study  is  structured  as  follows.
irst,  a  theoretical  framework  is  presented  in  which  the  rela-
ionship  between  the  level  of  diversiﬁcation  and  the  familial
ature  of  the  business  group  is  established  from  the  per-
pective  of  agency  theory,  complemented  by  the  concept
f  socio-emotional  wealth,  and  the  hypotheses  to  be  com-
ared  are  established.  Second,  we  present  the  database,
ariables,  and  methodologies  to  contrast  with  previously
stablished  hypotheses.  Third,  the  principal  results  of  the
tudy  are  shown.  Finally,  the  conclusions  and  implications
f  the  study,  its  limitations,  and  future  lines  of  investigation
re  given.
heoretical framework: the familial nature of
 company and business diversiﬁcation
he  inﬂuence  of  familial  nature  on  diversiﬁcation
trategy
hen  establishing  differences  between  family  and  non-
amily  businesses  with  respect  to  their  levels  diversiﬁcation,
he  point  of  departure  is  established  by  agency  theory.
on-family  businesses  present  a  variation  in  the  group  of
tockholders  that  is  greater  than  that  of  family  businesses
uch  that  their  executives  are  more  proactive  regarding  the
se  of  diversiﬁcation  strategies.  An  increase  in  the  size  of
he  enterprise  through  diversiﬁcation  can  mean  an  increase
2 Exceptions include the studies by Bertrand et al. (2008) and
ru and Crespi (2006), who contribute signiﬁcantly to the study of
articular aspects of corporate governance, using family business
roups in Thailand and Spain, respectively, as the unit of analysis.
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aInﬂuence  family  control  specialization  and  diversiﬁcation  of
in  ﬁnancial  compensation  and  the  prestige  of  executives
(Jensen,  1986),  a  promotion  to  a  higher  position  within  the
company  (Shleifer  and  Vishny,  1997),  and  even  a  reduction
in  the  personal  risk  of  job  loss,  guaranteeing  one’s  place  in
the  company  (Sayrak  and  Martin,  2001).
Conversely,  family  businesses  are  characterized  by  fam-
ily  members’  participation  in  the  management  and  direction
of  the  enterprise,  reducing  the  principal-agent  problem
(Jensen  and  Meckling,  1976;  Fama  and  Jensen,  1983;  Miller
and  Le  Breton-Miller,  2006),  and  incurring  lower  agency  costs
(lower  costs  for  recruiting  and  supervision  of  executives)
(Amihud  and  Lev,  1999).  Thus,  diversiﬁcation  in  the  fam-
ily  business  is  not  the  result  of  a  principal-agent  problem,
that  is,  the  consequence  of  executives’  greater  discretion  to
satisfy  their  own  interests  to  the  detriment  of  stockholders’
interests  and  maximizing  company  value.
Nevertheless,  in  the  case  in  which  most  or  almost  all
of  a  family’s  wealth  or  assets  are  committed  to  an  enter-
prise,  family  members  assume  such  an  elevated  degree  of
personal  risk  that  it  can  lead  to  the  appearance  of  impor-
tant  incentives  for  minimizing  that  risk  (Demsetz  and  Lehn,
1985;  Faccio  et  al.,  2001).  Corporate  diversiﬁcation  can  be
attractive  because  it  allows  not  only  for  mitigation  of  an
enterprise’s  risk  (and  therefore  the  risk  assumed  by  the
family)  but  also  for  reducing  the  variability  of  income  and
expected  results  (because  it  redistributes  family  wealth
among  various  enterprises  and  businesses).
However,  family  businesses  not  only  maximize  their
utility  function  in  accordance  with  ﬁnancial  results  and
the  reduction  of  risk  but  also  seek  to  achieve  objections
that  are  either  non-ﬁnancial  (Chrisman  et  al.,  2004) or
of  a  socio-emotional  nature  (Gomez-Mejia  et  al.,  2007,
2010).  Socio-emotional  wealth  describes  those  non-ﬁnancial
features  that  inﬂuence  the  utility  function  of  family  stock-
holders  (Gomez-Mejia  et  al.,  2007,  2010;  Cennamo  et  al.,
2012).  As  observed  by  Cennamo  et  al.  (2012),  socio-
emotional  wealth  includes:  (a)  the  desire  to  retain  family
control  of  an  enterprise;  (b)  the  identiﬁcation  of  the  family
with  the  enterprise;  (c)  the  establishment  of  lasting  rela-
tionships  with  the  various  stakeholders;  (d)  the  presence
of  emotional  bonds  that  not  only  favour  trust,  loyalty,  and
motivation  but  also  increase  the  degree  of  commitment  on
the  part  of  family  members  and  workers;  and  (e)  the  desire
to  assure  the  enterprise’s  survival.
In  its  utility  function,  the  family  maximizes  both  socio-
emotional  wealth  and  ﬁnancial  wealth  given  that  it  is
disposed  to  renounce  a  part  of  the  latter  to  preserve  the
former  (Gomez-Mejia  et  al.,  2010).  This  fact  is  evidenced  in
the  study  by  Gomez-Mejia  et  al.  (2007)  in  which  the  fear  of
losing  family  control  of  the  business  causes  olive  oil  pro-
ducing  family  businesses  to  show  a  lesser  preference  for
participating  in  cooperatives,  despite  the  ﬁnancial  advan-
tages  and  reduction  of  risk  offered  by  those  cooperatives.
Berrone  et  al.  (2010)  show  how  family  businesses  protect
the  family’s  public  image  (a  constituent  element  of  socio-
emotional  wealth)  by  polluting  less  than  other  companies,
even  though  there  is  no  economic  compensation  for  doing
so.More  speciﬁcally,  when  establishing  the  relation-
ship  between  diversiﬁcation  and  socio-emotional  wealth,
Gomez-Mejia  et  al.  (2010)  show  that  family  businesses  opt
for  lower  levels  of  diversiﬁcation  because  engaging  in  new
e
e
c
tness  groups  75
ctivities  involves  a  loss  of  socio-emotional  wealth  caused  by
he  need  to  incorporate  new  knowledge  through  hiring  new
xecutives  in  the  various  businesses,  thus  reducing  the  fam-
ly’s  inﬂuence  on  the  organization.  Similar  results  are  found
n  the  study  by  Gomez-Mejia  et  al.  (2011)  in  which  family
usinesses  have  a  lesser  desire  to  technologically  diversify,
iven  that  the  incorporation  of  new  stockholders  (usually
nstitutional  investors  or  venture  capital)  has  a negative
mpact  on  such  businesses’  stock  of  socio-emotional  wealth
Gomez-Mejia  et  al.,  2010).  In  summary,  there  is  empirical
vidence  for  the  proposition  that  family  businesses  diver-
ify  less  than  non-family  businesses  (Anderson  and  Reeb,
003;  Mansi  and  Reeb,  2002;  Jones  et  al.,  2008;  Gomez-
ejia  et  al.,  2010,  2011;  Mun˜oz-Bullón  and  Sánchez-Bueno,
011),  with  family  businesses  participating  in  fewer  corpo-
ate  acquisitions  than  non-family  businesses  (Miller  et  al.,
010).
To  sum  up,  diversiﬁcation  brings  with  it  the  need  for
nancial,  human,  and  material  resources  because  diversi-
cation  makes  it  necessary  both  to  identify  new  sources  of
nancing  and  to  hire  new  personnel  and/or  external  execu-
ives.  The  entry  of  new  agents  can  damage  socio-emotional
ealth  (Cennamo  et  al.,  2012)  when  family  independence
s  seen  as  reduced  (Anderson  and  Reeb,  2003;  Claver  et  al.,
009;  Gomez  Mejia  et  al.,  2010),  thus  negatively  impacting
he  control  exercised  by  family  members,  reducing  the  iden-
iﬁcation  of  the  family  with  the  company,  and  weakening
he  emotional  bonds  that  promote  trust,  loyalty,  and  com-
itment  to  the  enterprise  due  to  possible  conﬂicts  between
he  family  and  new  external  agents  (Cennamo  et  al.,  2012).
An  enterprise  can  manage  its  fundraising  policy  to
nﬂuence  the  impact  of  diversiﬁcation  on  socio-emotional
ealth.  If  a  family  business  uses  debt  to  ﬁnance  diversi-
cation  (Thomsen  and  Pedersen,  2000),  it  will  experience
ncreased  ﬁnancial  risk.  However,  the  use  of  debt  will  allow
he  business  to  maintain  control  of  its  resources  in  family
ands,  provided  the  business  fulﬁls  the  ﬁnancial  commit-
ents  stemming  from  indebtedness,  i.e.,  the  payment  of
rincipal  and  interest.  Failing  to  fulﬁl  these  commitments
ould  lead  to  a  loss  of  control  over  the  company’s  resources,
hich  would  be  transferred  to  the  ﬁnancial  entity  admin-
stering  the  debt,  thus  negatively  impacting  the  family’s
ocio-emotional  wealth.  Alternatively,  the  enterprise  can
se  its  own  funds----i.e.,  by  issuing  stock----to  ﬁnance  its
xpansion  via  diversiﬁcation.  Should  the  family’s  wealth  be
nsufﬁcient  to  ﬁnance  the  investment,  some  of  the  stock
ssued  will  be  purchased  by  non-family  partners,  which
ould  require  the  company  to  make  the  family’s  interests
ompatible  with  the  interests  of  the  new  partners.  In  this  sit-
ation,  the  entry  of  new  partners  poses  a risk  to  maintaining
 company’s  holdings  and  control  of  its  resources  in  family
ands  over  the  long  term  (Arregle  et  al.,  2007);  it  can  also
reate  the  appearance  of  conﬂicts  between  family  members
nd  non-family  members,  thus  damaging  the  social  system  of
nterpersonal  relationships  among  family  members  (Pearson
t  al.,  2008)  and  reducing  socio-emotional  wealth.
In  addition,  as  anticipated,  diversiﬁcation  implicitly
dmits  the  need  to  possess  business-speciﬁc  skills  and  knowl-
dge  that  may  be  lacking  among  family  members  (Schulze
t  al.,  2002;  Fernández  and  Nieto,  2006).  Diversiﬁcation  is  a
omplex  process  that  requires  new  routines  and  methods  in
he  centre  of  the  family  business  (Eisenmann,  2002),  along
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in  the  business  group  (through  concentration  of  holdings)
signiﬁcantly  increases  family  risk,  a  circumstance  that  can
endanger  the  business’s  survival.  The  executive  team  of  a
3 ‘‘Tunnelling’’ practices are usually associated with family busi-
nesses, given that they habitually appear to be linked with the
principal--principal agency problem (Faccio et al., 2001), with this
problem being characteristic of family businesses (Chrisman et al.,
2004; Zahra, 2010). However, these practices are usually found in
cases in which there is a signiﬁcant difference, for the controlling
stockholder (last holder) between voting rights and cash-ﬂow rights.
However, this situation does not exist in the majority of family busi-6  
ith  new  models  of  organization  (Bhaumik  et  al.,  2010).
uccessful  diversiﬁcation  requires  changes  in  systems  of
lanning  and  control  and  in  organizational  structure  (Zahra,
005),  whereas  in  general,  families  tend  to  preserve  their
‘status  quo’’  and  are  usually  hesitant  to  make  such  changes
Chang  et  al.,  2010).  Thus,  if  a  family  business  diversiﬁes,
t  must  not  only  incorporate  new  workers  and/or  non-family
xecutives  but  also  change  its  organizational  structure,  a
act  that  can  negatively  impact  the  familial  relationships
hat  are  a  part  of  socio-emotional  wealth  (Gomez-Mejia
t  al.,  2010).
Given  all  this,  family  businesses  will  opt  for  lower  levels
f  diversiﬁcation  to  preserve  their  socio-emotional  wealth
i.e.,  to  retain  control  of  the  enterprise,  to  preserve  famil-
al  relations,  and  to  avoid  the  appearance  of  conﬂict  with
on-family  members  who  become  part  of  the  company),
lthough  this  may  implicitly  include  increasing  ﬁnancial  risk
r  declining  new  investments  that  would  improve  the  busi-
ess’s  economic  position  and  performance  (Gomez-Mejia
t  al.,  2010).
In  accordance  with  the  theory  presented  above,  the  ﬁrst
ypothesis  is  established:
1.  The  familial  nature  of  the  business  group  has  a  nega-
ive  impact  on  the  use  of  diversiﬁcation.
he  moderating  effect  of  the  concentration  of
oldings on  the  relationship  between  familial
ature and  diversiﬁcation
hereas  the  previous  section  shows  that  familial  nature  has
 negative  impact  on  the  level  of  diversiﬁcation,  that  is,  that
amily  businesses  diversify  less  than  non-family  businesses,
n  this  section  we  intend  to  verify  whether  there  are  differ-
nces  in  the  level  of  diversiﬁcation  among  family  businesses
elated  to  the  level  of  concentration  of  holdings.  That  is,
his  section  answers  the  following  question:  Can  a  greater
oncentration  of  holdings  in  the  family  group  increase  the
evel  of  diversiﬁcation?  More  speciﬁcally,  can  concentration
f  stockholdings  have  a  moderating  effect  on  the  inﬂuence
f  familial  nature  on  the  level  of  diversiﬁcation?  Some  stud-
es  corroborate  the  existence  of  this  relationship,  showing
hat  elevated  levels  of  concentration  in  stockholding  in  a
amily  business  lead  to  increased  diversiﬁcation  (Kang,  1999;
ru  and  Crespi,  2006;  Chen  and  Yu,  2011;  George  and  Kabir,
012).
In  a  family  business,  when  there  is  an  elevated  degree
f  concentration  of  holdings  in  family  hands,  the  exec-
tive  team  can  make  decisions  that  help  reduce  family
isk,  although  doing  so  can  imply  harm  to  the  interests  of
he  minority  stockholders  (principal--principal  agency  prob-
em)  (Shleifer  and  Vishny,  1997).  The  family  business  can
ecide  to  implement  a  strategy  of  diversiﬁcation,  using  a
olding  structure  that  helps  make  its  ﬁnancial  objectives
or  risk  reduction  compatible  with  non-ﬁnancial  objectives
hat  correspond  to  socio-emotional  wealth.  In  the  business
roup  (holding  structure),  although  the  grouped  companies
etain  their  own  independent  legal  status,  their  economic
utonomy  is  reduced  because  they  have  ceded  numerous
ntrepreneurial  operations  to  the  parent  company.  This  can
e  the  source  of  beneﬁts  when  there  are  synergies  among
n
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he  various  dependent  companies,  but  it  can  also  be  a  poten-
ial  source  of  conﬂicts  of  interest  among  the  members  of  the
roup  (Khanna  and  Palepu,  2000;  Almeida  and  Wolfenzon,
006).
For  the  family,  based  on  a  positive  view  on  diversiﬁcation,
he  use  of  holding  structures  helps  to  optimize  ﬁnances,
educe  risks,  and  facilitate  the  sharing  of  resources  and
apacities  among  the  companies  in  the  group  (generating
ynergies  among  the  various  businesses);  it  also  helps  the
roup’s  parent  company  to  direct,  manage,  and  control  the
ependent  companies  (Almeida  and  Wolfenzon,  2006;  Chen
nd  Yu,  2011).  By  diversifying  into  new  businesses  through  a
olding  structure,  the  risk  assumed  by  the  parent  company
nd  the  family  is  reduced,  which  will  have  a positive  inﬂu-
nce  on  the  survival  of  the  family  business  (and  thus  on  its
ocio-emotional  wealth).
However,  diversiﬁcation  can  be  negative  (when  it  is
mplemented  with  objectives  that  do  not  support  synergies
mong  businesses  and/or  companies),  facilitating  the  expro-
riation  of  the  wealth  of  minority  stockholders  in  favour  of
amily  stockholders  through  the  use  of  ‘‘tunnelling’’  prac-
ices  (Faccio  et  al.,  2001;  Bertrand  et  al.,  2002)  that  are
ore  easily  established  through  business  holdings  (Morck
t  al.,  2005).  These  practices  consist  of  the  family’s  expro-
riation  of  part  of  the  wealth  of  minority  stockholders,
ransferring  of  stocks  or  proﬁts  from  dependent  compa-
ies  to  the  parent  company  or  diverting  cash  ﬂow  from
ome  companies  to  others  (Johnson  et  al.,  2000;  Aguiar  and
antana,  2008).3
From  the  perspective  of  socio-emotional  wealth,  concen-
ration  of  holdings  in  the  family  group  can  have  a  dual
nﬂuence  on  the  level  of  diversiﬁcation.  First,  when  the
evel  of  concentration  of  holdings  in  family  hands  allows
t  to  exercise  effective  control  over  the  company  and  its
esources,  we  see  the  family’s  wish  to  preserve  socio-
motional  wealth  (Berrone  et  al.,  2012).  In  principle,  this
act  reﬂects  that  to  the  extent  that  concentration  of  fam-
ly  ownership  (and  the  family’s  effective  control  over  the
ompany)  increases,  the  family’s  interest  in  diversifying
he  business  group  decreases.  However,  the  concept  of
ocio-emotional  wealth  encompasses  the  desire  for  the  com-
any’s  survival  and  transmission  to  later  generations.  The
nclusion  of  the  desire  for  long-term  survival  within  the
amily  group  in  the  analysis  leads  us  to  consider  that  an
ncreased  commitment  (investment)  of  family  wealth-assetsesses, in which in practice, the two rights are paired, given the
ommon situation of a high level of concentration of ownership
n family hands, thus allowing family members to exercise either
ajority or absolute control (Aguiar and Santana, 2008).
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family  business  can  opt  for  diversiﬁcation  as  a  means  of  both
reducing  this  (personal  and  business)  risk  and  improving  the
odds  of  the  business’s  survival.
Given  this  dual  effect  of  structure  of  ownership  on
diversiﬁcation,  it  is  worth  asking  which  of  these  effects
predominates.  If  the  family  seeks  to  avoid  losing  effective
control  of  the  business  group,  or  if  control  is  not  assured
when  diversifying,  it  seems  logical  to  think  that  the  negative
effect  of  familial  nature  on  diversiﬁcation  will  predominate.
However,  if  the  family  has  assured  its  effective  control  of
the  business  group,  and  this  control  is  not  endangered  by
diversifying,  the  attempt  to  reduce  personal  and  business
risk,  along  with  the  search  for  continuity  and  survival  of  the
family  business  in  family  hands,  will  lead  to  the  strategy  of
diversiﬁcation.
The  family  business  will  decide  what  level  of  diversiﬁ-
cation  will  allow  it  to  optimize  its  utility  function  through
optimizing  its  components----i.e.,  ﬁnancial  outcomes  and
non-ﬁnancial  outcomes  (socio-emotional  wealth)----such  that
it  will  weigh  the  costs  and  beneﬁts  of  diversiﬁcation  related
to  its  utility  function.  When  the  beneﬁts  stemming  from
diversiﬁcation  (including  the  reduction  of  risk  tolerated)  are
greater  than  the  costs  generated  (in  terms  of  loss  of  socio-
emotional  wealth),  the  level  of  diversiﬁcation  will  be  higher.
Conversely,  when  the  costs  arising  from  diversiﬁcation  are
greater  than  the  beneﬁts  that  it  generates,  the  level  of
diversiﬁcation  will  be  lower.
As  indicated  by  Gomez-Mejia  et  al.  (2010),  there  are
circumstances  in  which  family  businesses  can  beneﬁt  from
the  advantages  of  diversiﬁcation  even  when  diversiﬁcation
negatively  impacts  socio-emotional  wealth.  More  speciﬁ-
cally,  the  greater  the  systematic  and  non-systematic  risks,
the  higher  the  level  of  diversiﬁcation  (Gomez-Mejia  et  al.,
2010).4
Given  what  has  been  stated  above,  although  familial
nature  negatively  impacts  the  level  of  diversiﬁcation,  the
relationship  between  the  two  can  be  affected  by  concentra-
tion  of  holdings.  When  concentration  of  holdings  is  elevated
in  the  family  group,  family  agents  can  opt  to  increase  the
size  of  the  company  and  the  number  of  activities  conducted
to  reduce  the  risk  taken.  Thus,  as  holdings  in  the  fam-
ily  group  become  concentrated,  the  propensity  to  diversify
increases,  that  is,  the  inﬂuence  of  familial  nature  on  diver-
siﬁcation  is  moderated  by  the  greater  percentage  of  stock
held  by  family  members.  Thus,  the  following  hypothesis  is
suggested:H2.  The  concentration  of  holdings  has  a  positive  moder-
ating  effect  on  the  relationship  between  familial  nature
and  diversiﬁcation,  with  family  business  groups  showing  a
4 Galve and Salas (1994) ﬁnd, for a sample of listed Spanish
family companies, a very signiﬁcant relationship between non-
diversiﬁable risk and stock concentration. For these companies,
the basic hypotheses seem to be fulﬁlled regarding determinants
of concentration of ownership, showing themselves to be highly
affected both by the degree of non-diversiﬁable risk and by the
disutility of this risk as the size of the investment increases. The
holding structure is suggested as an opportunity to diversify this risk
among the ﬁnal owners of this holding. The lower weighting of risk
also reduces the marginal cost of increasing size (via diversiﬁcation)
for a given level of stock concentration.
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reater  preference  for  diversiﬁcation  as  the  level  of  concen-
ration  of  holdings  increases.
ethodology
ample  and  sources  of  information
his  study  begins  with  a  sample  of  enterprises  listed  on
he  Spanish  stock  markets  during  the  2000--20055 period
elonging  to  various  sectors  of  activity,  excluding  the  ﬁnan-
ial  sector  and  the  energy  sector.  After  requiring  that  the
ompanies  in  the  sample  be  listed  throughout  the  entire
eriod,  and  having  eliminated  the  companies  that  lacked
ll  of  the  necessary  information,  the  ﬁnal  sample  included
9  companies  (for  594  observations).  To  establish  the  famil-
al  nature  of  the  ﬁnal  owner  of  the  parent  company  listed
nd  thus  of  the  business  group,  both  the  Spanish  Securi-
ies  Market  Commission  (Comisión  Nacional  del  Mercado  de
alores----CNMV)  (www.cnmv.es)  web  page  and  the  Iberian
alance  Sheet  Information  System  (SABI-Informa  database)
ere  used.  We  occasionally  drew  on  secondary  sources  of
nformation  such  as  periodicals,  the  trade  press,  and  the
eb  pages  of  companies  in  the  sample.  Finally,  to  deter-
ine  the  use  of  specialization  strategies  and  to  calculate
he  level  of  diversiﬁcation  (measured  according  to  the  cor-
ected  Herﬁndahl  index),  we  used  the  information  provided
y  the  CNMV,  identifying  those  companies  that  form  part  of
 pyramidal  group  headed  by  the  listed  parent  company  and
omplementing  this  information  with  that  provided  in  the
ABI-Informa6 database.
ariables
ependent  variables:  specialization  and  diversiﬁcation
ost  studies  only  consider  those  activities  conducted  at  the
usiness  level  to  measure  the  level  of  diversiﬁcation  (Kang,
999;  Anderson  and  Reeb,  2003;  Gomez-Mejia  et  al.,  2010;
illalonga  and  Amit,  2006).  However,  this  study  considered
t  more  pertinent  to  analyse  both  the  activities  carried  out
y  the  business  group’s  parent  company  and  the  pyramidal
roup  of  companies  dependent  on  the  parent.  Consider-
tion  of  the  group’s  activities  allows  diversiﬁcation  to  be
easured  in  a more  objective  way.  Exclusively  studying  the
ctivities  of  a  group’s  parent  company  results  in  ignoring
he  activities  of  the  companies  that  form  part  of  the  parent
ompany’s  global  strategy  (Chen  and  Yu,  2011).  The  levels
f  diversiﬁcation  obtained  in  this  study  will  be  greater  than
hose  that  would  be  obtained  if  we  had  only  considered
he  parent  company’s  activities.  Annex  I  shows  an  example
f  the  differences  in  the  number  of  activities  considered,
5 This period is taken as reference because of various occurrences
hat began in 2005 (Zozaya, 2007): (a) an atypical 2006 year with
 very high number of company mergers and acquisitions (a 45%
ncrease between 2005 and 2006); and (b) a 2007 law regarding
ublic takeover bids of companies that differed from the law that
xisted during the 2000--2005 period.
6 Note that for each business group, national companies were
onsidered, including non-national companies whenever that infor-
ation was available in the SABI-Informa database.
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company  of  the  business  group  (Kang,  1999).8 For  family
groups,  the  values  adopted  for  these  variables  show  a  near
match  with  the  level  of  concentration  in  the  hands  of  family
7 For example, a family is the main stockholder for company X,
for which it has 40% of the voting rights. In turn, this company is
the main stockholder of company Y, having 30% of its voting rights.
Thus, the family would be the ﬁnal owner of company Y, for a level
of control of 10%, given that it has 30% of the voting rights of com-
pany Y (the weakest link of the chain of command: the minimum
of 40% and 30%). If, for example, the family also directly possesses
approximately 10% of the voting rights of company Y, the family
would be the ﬁnal owner of company Y, in this case holding 40% of
its voting rights (10% directly + the minimum of 40% and 30%).
8 For family business groups, these variables can be likened to8  
epending  on  whether  the  activities  correspond  to  the
arent  company  or  to  the  total  group;  when  one  uses  the
usiness  group  as  the  unit  of  measure,  these  activities  are
onsiderably  more  numerous.
The  Spanish  General  Accounting  Plan  considers  as  group
usinesses  those  companies  over  which  the  (listed)  parent
ompany  exerts  or  can  exert  effective  control,  whether
irectly  or  indirectly.  A  group’s  businesses  are  identiﬁed
n  listed  parent  companies’  annual  consolidated  ﬁnancial
eports,  which  are  provided  on  the  CNMV’s  web  page.  Thus,
 company  is  considered  a  dependent  of  the  listed  parent
ompany  either  if  the  latter  possesses  more  than  50%  of  the
tock  of  the  dependent  company  or  if  it  possesses  a lower
ercentage  of  stock  but  still  has  the  ability  to  exert  effective
ontrol  over  the  dependent  company.
Once  the  companies  of  the  group  have  been  identiﬁed,
heir  accounting  reports  are  analysed  using  the  information
rovided  by  the  SABI-Informa  database  when  the  dependent
ompanies  are  not  listed  on  the  exchange.  This  information
nables  identiﬁcation  of  the  activities  conducted  by  each
ompany,  using  the  CNAE  93  Rev.  1  classiﬁcation.
For  the  empirical  study,  qualitative  and  quantitative
easures  of  diversiﬁcation  are  chosen  to  demonstrate  the
obustness  of  results  regardless  of  the  measures  employed.
hus,  the  variables  considered  are  as  follows:
(a)  Specialization:  a  qualitative  dummy  variable  (SPE),
whose  value  is  one  when  the  listed  company  and  its
dependent  companies  carry  out  the  same/single  activity
and  zero  in  any  other  situation  (i.e.,  when  the  company
diversiﬁes  its  activities).
b)  Total  diversiﬁcation:  the  corrected  Herﬁndahl  index  is
used  as  a  quantitative  variable  (Montgomery,  1982);  this
index  is  one  of  the  most  commonly  used  measures  in  the
literature  (Pérez,  1998).  The  corrected  Herﬁndahl  index
(HERF)  is  estimated  using  the  following  expression:
1  −
n∑
i=1
S2i ,
where  Si is  the  market  share  of  segment/activity  i com-
pared  to  the  total  sales  of  the  group  and  n  is  the  number
of  activities  of  the  group.  This  index  includes  a  relation-
ship  with  positive  diversiﬁcation,  with  values  close  to  0
when  the  group  opts  for  greater  specialization  of  activi-
ties  and  approaching  1  when  the  group  produces  equally
in  a  large  number  of  segments.  Activities  are  considered
distinct  when  they  differ  in  the  four  digits  of  the  CNAE  93
Rev.  1  classiﬁcation.  To  estimate  this  index,  one  iden-
tiﬁes  the  level  of  sales  ﬁgures  and  the  main  activities
carried  out  by  both  the  group’s  parent  company  and  its
dependent  companies.
ndependent  variables:  family  group  and  concentration
f  holdings
ith  respect  to  variables  of  ownership,  a  signiﬁcant  vari-
ty  of  deﬁnitions  are  used  to  characterize  an  enterprise
s  a  family  business  (Mazzi,  2011).  In  this  study,  a  group
s  considered  a  family  group  (FAM)  when  the  family  (family
embers)  not  only  possess  the  most  signiﬁcant  (direct  or
ndirect)  stake  in  shares  of  the  parent  company  of  the  group
t
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ut  also  one  or  more  of  family  members  occupy  key  positions
oth  in  the  company’s  management  and  on  its  board,  and  the
ompany  continues  to  be  a  family  company  throughout  the
tudy  period  (Chua  et  al.,  1999;  Miller  and  Le  Breton-Miller,
006).  Family  members  are  considered  to  be  those  who  share
he  same  surname  or  who  constitute  a  married  couple.  This
eﬁnition  of  family  business  coincides  with  the  deﬁnition  of
amily  business  proposed  by  the  European  Group  of  Owner
anaged  and  Family  Businesses  (GEEF),  a  European  associa-
ion  that  includes  family  associations  from  various  countries.
To  conﬁrm  the  correct  classiﬁcation  of  the  groups,  the
orizontal  and  vertical  chains  of  ownership  were  analysed
sing  the  methodology  proposed  by  La  Porta  et  al.  (1999)
nd  used  in  later  studies  (Claessens  et  al.,  2000;  Santana
nd  Aguiar,  2006),  which  allows  one  to  identify  both  the  ﬁnal
wner  of  the  listed  parent  company  and  the  parent  com-
any  of  the  business  group;  it  also  enables  one  to  establish
he  familial  nature  of  the  company.  A  company  is  considered
o  have  a  ﬁnal  owner  when  its  main  stockholder  directly  or
ndirectly  holds  a  percentage  of  participation  in  voting  rights
hat  is  equal  or  superior  to  10%  (La  Porta  et  al.,  1999).  Iden-
iﬁcation  of  the  ﬁnal  owner  is  performed  through  chains  of
ommand.  In  this  way,  when  the  stock  of  one  company  is  in
he  hands  of  another  company,  one  analyses  the  ownership
f  the  voting  rights  of  the  latter  by  identifying  its  principal
tockholder,  and  so  on  until  arriving  at  the  ﬁnal  voting-
ights  owner  (Claessens  et  al.,  2000;  Santana  and  Aguiar,
006).7 The  classiﬁcation  of  groups  of  companies  accord-
ng  to  the  familial  nature  of  the  ﬁnal  owner  coincides  with
he  previously  established  method,  which  considers  the  par-
icipation  of  the  family  in  stockholding  and  management,
long  with  the  direction  of  the  parent  companies  of  business
roups.
Working  from  the  initial  sample  of  99  enterprises,  58  of
hich  were  family  businesses  in  2000,  one  sees  that  eight
f  those  enterprises  came  to  be  controlled  by  non-family
gents  (13.79%),  with  the  50  remaining  companies  remaining
nder  the  control  of  family  agents  (86.21%).  Thus,  for  the
ample  analysed,  50  family  groups  are  identiﬁed  (50.51%).
As  variables  of  concentration  of  holdings,  the  study  used
he  percentage  of  stocks  in  the  hands  of  the  main  stock-
older  (%  1  STOCK),  the  three  main  stockholders  (%  3  STOCK)
nd  the  ﬁve  main  stockholders  (%  5  STOCK)  of  the  parenthe concentration of family ownership, because in most cases the
apital in the hands of the ﬁve main stockholders belongs to family
embers when considering the capital in the hands of the main
tockholder and/or the three main stockholders.
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agents,  especially  the  ﬁrst  two  (%  1  STOCK  and  %  3  STOCK),  in
which  the  main  stockholder  or  the  three  main  stockholders
coincide  with  family  agents.9
Control  variables
In  line  with  previous  investigations  on  the  subject  (Anderson
and  Reeb,  2003;  Gomez-Mejia  et  al.,  2010;  Chen  and  Yu,
2011),  the  following  control  variables  were  considered  for
the  study  of  diversiﬁcation.  First,  we  considered  variables
related  to  the  achievement  of  synergetic  effects  on  costs,
sales,  or  risks:  ‘‘Size  of  the  parent  company’’,  which  is  mea-
sured  through  a  logarithm  of  the  total  assets  of  the  listed
company  (LN  SIZE);  ‘‘Age’’,  that  is,  the  number  of  years
since  the  creation  of  the  listed  company  expressed  in  log-
arithm  form  (LN  AGE);  ‘‘Indebtedness’’,  measured  as  the
quotient  of  total  debt  and  the  total  stock  of  the  listed  parent
company  (DEBT);  ‘‘Intensity  of  capital’’,  measured  as  the
quotient  of  the  sum  of  immobilized  material  and  immaterial
capital  and  the  number  of  workers  (INT  CAPIT);  ‘‘Investment
in  intangibles’’,  which  expresses  the  investment  effort  in
new  technologies  made  on  the  part  of  the  listed  parent  com-
pany,  as  measured  through  the  relation  of  intangible  stocks
to  total  stocks  (INTANG).  Second,  we  considered  variables
related  to  the  use  of  the  strategy  of  diversiﬁcation  that  could
lead  to  harm  against  minority  stockholders:  ‘‘Difference
existing  between  the  economic  proﬁtability  of  the  enter-
prise  in  comparison  to  the  average  economic  proﬁtability
per  year  for  companies  in  the  sample’’  (PR-PR  YEAR),10 for
analysing  the  incentives  for  stockholders  to  supervise  the
executive  team  in  the  decision-making  process  (a  major
difference  in  favour  of  the  enterprise  implies  lower  discon-
tent  by  the  stockholders  with  their  investment  and  thus,  a
lower  need  for  the  executive  team  to  implement  diversi-
ﬁcation  strategies  to  achieve  close-to-average  proﬁtability
and  to  avoid  conﬂict,  guaranteeing  their  place  in  company
11management) ;  ‘‘Structural  change  in  the  company  listed’’,
which  is  measured  through  a  dummy  variable  that  takes  the
value  of  1  when  some  structural  change  has  taken  place  in
the  listed  company  and  0  in  any  other  case  (SCD.  This  ﬁnal
9 Although in analysing the concentration of ownership of the ﬁve
stockholders (% 5 STOCK) non-family members may be included,
as is observed in the results obtained later in the econometric
models, their relevance is limited; we arrive at the same conclu-
sions regardless of the variable of concentration of ownership used
in the econometric models.
10 An alternate variable would be Tobin’s q, a measure of proﬁt-
ability in terms of the market that would reﬂect the expectations of
investors with respect to the business group headed by the parent
company listed. However, given that the volume and frequency of
stocks contracting in the market for all listed parent companies is
low, the use of Tobin’s q does not express the reality of these com-
panies; it is more appropriate to use the differences in proﬁtability
used in this study. It is normal for the literature to include variables
that consider a company’s proﬁtability (Chen and Yu, 2011; Ducassy
and Prevot, 2010; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010).
11 Analogously, a greater negative difference would imply the
stockholders’ greater discontent with the executive team and
increase their supervision of the team. The executive team would
opt for greater levels of diversiﬁcation to move company proﬁtabil-
ity toward the average proﬁtability of the market, thus avoiding
demotion or termination.
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ariable  allows  one  to  control  those  listed  companies  that
articipated  in  processes  of  mergers  and/or  acquisition  dur-
ng  the  2000--2005  period,  given  that  this  could  represent
 signiﬁcant  change  in  a  company’s  diversiﬁcation  strategy
nd  thus  change  its  levels  of  diversiﬁcation.
conometric  techniques
o  compare  the  two  hypotheses  formulated,  and  with  the
urpose  of  assuring  the  robustness  of  the  results  obtained,
e  perform  a  dual  analysis  as  a  function  of  the  qualita-
ive  and  quantitative  character  of  the  dependent  variable
hat  measures  diversiﬁcation.  First,  diversiﬁcation  is  repre-
ented  through  the  dummy  variable  ‘‘Specialization’’,  using
 binary  logistic  regression  model.  In  this  case,  the  absence
f  the  existence  of  multicollinearity  (Menard,  2002)  and
he  validity  of  the  models  are  shown  through  estimation  of
he  likelihood  ratio,  Cox  and  Snell’s  R2, Nagelkerke’s  R2,
nd  the  Hosmer--Lemeshow  test,  using  the  program  SPSS
5.0.
Second,  diversiﬁcation  is  measured  through  the  cor-
ected  Herﬁndahl  index  for  quantitative-type  variables.  In
his  case,  to  estimate  the  impact  of  family  control  on  diversi-
cation,  two  models  are  offered:  a  simpler  model  of  ordinary
east  squares  (OLS)  and  a  second,  more  advanced  Heckman
election  model.
When  using  the  Heckman  selection  model,  one  implicitly
onsiders  that  the  diversiﬁcation  strategy  involves  two  types
f  decisions:  ﬁrst,  if  one  opts  for  diversifying  or  specializing
ctivities;  and  second,  if  one  diversiﬁes,  the  extent  to  which
ne  diversiﬁes.  If  one  estimates  the  model  by  OLS  either
sing  all  observations  or  using  only  the  observations  in  which
he  group  diversiﬁes  (does  not  specialize),  it  is  possible  to
btain  biased  and  inconsistent  estimators  (Heckman,  1979;
addala,  1983).  To  correct  this  bias,  one  applies  a  Heck-
an  selection  model12 (1979)  for  simultaneously  addressing
he  determinants  of  the  decision  to  diversify  and  the  deci-
ion  about  the  level  of  diversiﬁcation.  The  model  consists  of
wo  steps:  in  the  ﬁrst  step,  a  Probit  model  is  estimated  for
aximum  likelihood,  in  which  the  inﬂuence  of  independent
ariables  on  the  decision  to  diversify  is  analysed;  in  the  sec-
nd  step,  based  on  the  estimates  provided  by  the  ﬁrst  step,
he  model  analyses  the  inﬂuence  of  the  independent  varia-
les  on  the  truncated  dependent  variable,  that  is,  on  the
evel  of  diversiﬁcation.
In this  study,  the  Probit  model  is  estimated  in  the
rst  step,  in  which  the  endogenous  variable  is  the  dummy
ariable  Diversiﬁcation  (1  for  diversiﬁcation,  0  for  special-
zation)  and  the  independent  variables  are  those  considered
n  the  OLS  model  together  with  a new  variable,  the  rate
f  sales  growth  for  the  year.13 At  this  step,  one  calculates
he  Mills  Lambda  corresponding  to  the  decision  to  diversify
div),  which  is  incorporated  in  the  second  step  as  one  more
12 Given that the values of the dependent variable for the cor-
ected Herﬁndahl index are between 0 and 1, the use of a Tobit
odel was also evaluated, although the result for the likelihood
atio statistic comparing the Tobit model with the Heckman model
uggests that the latter is more appropriate.
13 This variable is included to avoid problems of multicollinearity
n the application of the two-step Heckman model (Achen, 1986).
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Table  1  Percentage  of  specialized  companies  and  annual  average  diversiﬁcation  of  business  groups  in  the  2000--2005  period
related to  the  familial  nature  of  the  ﬁnal  owner.
2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  Total
Specialization  (%)
Family  34.00%  40.00%  36.00%  38.00%  36.00%  28.00%  35.33%
Non-family 14.29%  10.20%  12.24%  12.24%  14.29%  10.20%  12.24%
Total 24.24%  25.25%  24.24%  25.25%  25.25%  19.19%  23.91%
Corrected Herﬁndahl  index  (mean)
Family  0.219  0.230  0.234  0.234  0.237  0.246  0.233
Non-family 0.339  0.345  0.366  0.381  0.384  0.374  0.365
Total 0.278 0.287  0.299  0.306  0.310  0.309  0.298
Source:  Author.
N = 99 listed parent companies.
Table  2  Differences  in  means  of  the  main  variables  of  the  study  related  to  the  familial  nature  of  the  ﬁnal  owner.
Family  (n  =  300) Non-family  (n  =  294) T-Student U-Mann  Whitney
Mean Mean
Corrected  Herﬁndahl  index  0.233  0.365  −5.765*** −6.552***
%  1  STOCK  41.74%  27.97%  6.904*** −8.672***
%  3  STOCK  59.47%  43.03%  8.608*** −8.259***
%  5  STOCK  65.96%  48.36%  9.217*** −8.252***
LN  SIZE  11.46  12.45  −8.071*** −7.790***
LN  AGE  3.59  3.66  −1.192  −2.545**
DEBT  0.37  0.39  −1.244  −1.244
INTANG 0.025  0.034  −1.252  −3.011***
PR-PR  YEAR  −0.006  0.006  −2.025** −0.836
INT CAPIT  4.56  4.84  −1.763* −0.671
SCD 18%  27%  −2.506** −2.498**
* p < .10.
** p < .05.
*** p < .01.
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rected  Herﬁndahl  index  for  the  familial  nature  of  the  ﬁnal
owner.  It  can  be  seen  that  family  groups  present  lower  val-
ues,  both  for  the  entire  period  and  for  each  of  the  yearsariable  for  the  model  and  helps  correct  possible  selection
ias  due  to  diversiﬁcation  (Greene,  1999).  We  also  pro-
ose  a  second  possible  selection  bias,  which  arises  from
onsidering  companies’  family  or  non-familial  holdings  as  an
xogenous  datum  (Demsetz  and  Lehn,  1985).  Thus,  in  prior
odels  calculated  at  the  second  step  (determination  of  the
evel  of  diversiﬁcation)  one  includes  the  lambda  fam as  the
xplicative  variable.  This  variable  is  estimated  using  a Pro-
it  model  whose  dependent  variable  is  the  familial  nature  of
he  group;  the  independent  variables  are  the  dichotomous
ariables  of  the  sector,  the  size  of  the  business,  and  the  cost
f  the  debt  as  a  measure  of  risk  (Galve  and  Salas,  2011).  The
conometric  program  STATA  10.1  (provided  by  StataCorp  LP)
as  used  to  estimate  the  models.
Although  there  is  a  panel  of  99  companies  over  6  years,
ny  unobservable  heterogeneity  has  been  corrected,  and  the
ompany  effect  has  been  considered,  panel  data  methodolo-
ies  were  not  used  for  two  reasons:  (a)  a  panel  data  logistic
egression  only  considers  those  business  groups  that  vary  in
iversiﬁcation  strategy  during  the  period  and  cannot  esti-
ate  the  effect  of  the  invariant  variables  over  time  (familial
ature);  and  (b)  because  the  values  of  the  corrected  Herﬁnd-
hl  index  vary  between  0  and  1,  the  use  of  panel  data  Tobit
w
s
models  would  be  necessary,  although  these  models  cannot
e  estimated  in  the  presence  of  ﬁxed  effects.14
esults and discussion
able  1  shows  that  approximately  24%  of  the  groups  analysed
pt  to  specialize  their  activities,  although  there  are  clear
ifferences  according  to  whether  the  ﬁnal  owner  is  a  family
gent.  Thirty-ﬁve  point  thirty-three  percent  of  family  groups
pt  for  specialization,  compared  to  12.24%  of  non-family
roups.  In  general  terms,  the  percentage  of  specialized
nterprises  remains  constant  during  the  2001--2004  period,
ith  the  percentage  of  specialized  enterprises  diminishing
n  2005.  Table  1  also  shows  the  annual  means  of  the  cor-14 STATA does not allow for estimating Tobit panel data models
ith ﬁxed effects. Although one could make an approximation using
emi-parametric estimations (Honore and Kyriazidou, 2000), this
ethodology is still being developed.
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.Inﬂuence  family  control  specialization  and  diversiﬁcation  of
analysed,  in  agreement  with  the  results  obtained  regarding
specialization.
Table  2  shows  the  mean  values  of  the  variables  of  the
model,  along  with  the  existence  of  differences  between
the  groups  under  family  control  compared  to  the  other
groups.  First,  the  differences  in  the  level  of  diversiﬁca-
tion  observed  in  Table  1  are  signiﬁcant,  supporting  lower
diversiﬁcation  of  groups  under  family  control.  We  also  see  a
greater  concentration  of  holdings  in  the  listed  parent  com-
panies  under  family  control  for  all  of  the  measures  employed
(i.e.,  the  percentage  of  stock  in  the  hands  of  the  main,
three  main,  and  ﬁve  main  stockholders).  With  respect  to
the  rest  of  the  variables,  the  parent  companies  of  family
groups  are  less  intensive  in  productive  capital,  are  smaller
in  size,  and  participated  in  fewer  merger-and-acquisition
processes.  However,  one  can  also  see  the  absence  of  signif-
icant  differences  in  age,  in  investment  in  intangibles,  and
in  indebtedness  among  family  parent  companies  and  non-
family  parent  companies  (Anderson  and  Reeb,  2003;  Ducassy
and  Prevot,  2010;  Chen  and  Yu,  2011).  Conversely,  and  with
respect  to  the  mean  scatter  of  the  results,  ‘‘proﬁtability
of  company  investment  compared  to  the  average  proﬁtabil-
ity  of  companies  from  the  sample’’,  signiﬁcant  differences
were  observed  between  family  and  non-family  groups  (with
the  difference  in  value  being  minimal)  such  that  family
parent  companies  obtained  worse  results.  This  ﬁnding  can
conﬁrm  that  in  some  cases,  family  groups  are  ready  to
sacriﬁce  ﬁnancial  performance  for  preservation  of  their
socio-emotional  wealth.
Table  3  shows  the  existing  correlations  among  the  differ-
ent  variables  of  the  model  along  with  their  mean,  minimum,
and  maximum  values.  Family  groups  show  a  positive  cor-
relation  with  specialization  and  a  negative  relationship
with  the  level  of  diversiﬁcation,  corroborating  previous
results.  Moreover,  familial  nature  shows  a  positive  relation-
ship  with  the  variables  of  concentration  of  holdings  and
a  negative  relationship  with  the  size  of  the  listed  com-
pany,  age,  investment  in  intangibles,  and  participation  in
merger-and-acquisition  processes.  In  turn,  the  variables  that
express  concentration  of  holdings  have  a  positive  relation-
ship  with  the  use  of  strategies  of  specialization  and  a
negative  relationship  with  the  corrected  Herﬁndahl  index.
Regarding  the  variables  for  specialization  and  the  corrected
Herﬁndahl  index,  the  correlation  data  reﬂect  that  special-
ization  has  an  inverse  relationship  with  size,  indebtedness,
investment  in  intangibles,  and  participation  in  merger-
and-acquisition  processes.  However,  for  the  corrected
Herﬁndahl  index,  there  is  a  positive  relationship  with  size,
indebtedness,  and  participation  in  merger-and-acquisition
processes;  there  is  a  negative  relationship  with  the  spread
of  the  company’s  economic  proﬁtability  compared  to  the
mean  of  the  sample  for  the  year  and  the  intensity  of
capital.
As  noted  in  ‘Econometric  techniques’  section,
in  analysing  the  inﬂuence  of  family  control  on
diversiﬁcation----and  to  guarantee  the  robustness  of  the
results  obtained  regardless  of  the  measure  of  diversiﬁcation
used----a  binary  logistic  regression  is  chosen  when  the  qual-
itative  dependent  variable  is  ‘‘Specialization’’  (Table  4),
and  OLS  (Table  5)  and  the  Heckman  selection  method
(Table  6)  are  chosen  when  the  quantitative  dependent
variable  corresponds  with  the  corrected  Herﬁndahl  index.
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Table  4  Logit  regression:  the  inﬂuence  of  family  control  on  specialization.
Specialization
(1)
ˇ-coef
(Wald)
(2)
ˇ-coef
(Wald)
(3)
ˇ-coef
(Wald)
(4)
ˇ-coef
(Wald)
(5)
ˇ-coef
(Wald)
(6)
ˇ-coef
(Wald)
(7)
ˇ-coef
(Wald)
FAM  0.508* 0.360  0.291  0.280  0.969** 1.804** 1.768**
(3.152)  (1.467)  (0.935)  (0.852)  (4.250)  (6.362)  (4.445)
% 1  STOCK  1.121* 2.220**
(3.216)  (6.494)
% 3  STOCK 1.607** 2.918***
(6.019)  (11.381)
% 5  STOCK  1.606** 2.703***
(6.066)  (9.635)
% 1  STOCK  *  FAM  −1.846*
(2.924)
% 3  STOCK  *  FAM −2.870**
(5.505)
% 5  STOCK  *  FAM −2.519*
(3.635)
LN SIZE  −1.371*** −1.376*** −1.347*** −1.337*** −1.400*** −1.397*** −1.392***
(80.391)  (78.844)  (75.660)  (74.935)  (81.383)  (79.908)  (77.754)
LN AGE  0.415* 0.433* 0.440* 0.420* 0.457** 0.449* 0.418*
(3.375)  (3.597)  (3.713)  (3.392)  (3.906)  (3.714)  (3.249)
DEBT 3.364*** 3.501*** 3.379*** 3.300*** 3.489*** 3.343*** 3.354***
(22.922)  (21.851)  (19.700)  (18.522)  (21.796)  (19.833)  (19.681)
INTANG 0.970  1.471  1.778  1.817  1.836  2.603  2.662
(0.370) (0.812)  (1.088)  (1.093)  (1.190)  (2.203)  (2.183)
PR-PR YEAR  1.448  1.780  1.487  1.177  1.579  1.121  0.857
(0.726) (1.802)  (0.758)  (0.474)  (0.836)  (0.422)  (0.247)
INT CAPIT  0.218*** 0.160** 0.143* 0.162** 0.153** 0.130* 0.143**
(10.187)  (4.575)  (3.726)  (5.194)  (4.199)  (3.019)  (3.882)
SCD −1.838* −2.076* −2.181** −2.154** −2.057* −2.042* −1.988*
(3.084)  (3.829)  (4.244)  (4.163)  (3.782)  (3.743)  (3.556)
CONSTANT 10.258*** 10.259*** 9.615*** 9.422*** 10.117*** 9.552*** 9.498***
(33.934)  (32.922)  (28.556)  (27.210)  (32.073)  (27.940)  (27.228)
Hosmer Lemeshow  10.642  13.837  11.499  5.778  13.558  10.288  8.313
Likelihood ratio  375.002  371.790  368.883  368.792  368.909  363.309  365.097
Chi-square 238.760*** 241.972*** 244.879*** 244.696*** 244.852*** 250.452*** 248.665***
R2 Cox  and  Snell  0.345  0.349  0.352  0.352  0.352  0.359  0.357
R2 Nagelkerske  0.520  0.256  0.531  0.531  0.531  0.541  0.538
Correctly classiﬁed  85.6%  86.9%  85.8%  86.0%  86.3%  85.5%  85.6%
* p < .10.
** p < .05.
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Table  4  presents  the  results  of  the  various  binary  logis-
ic  models  that  explain  the  inﬂuence  of  a  group’s  familial
ature  on  specialization  without  considering  the  variables
or  concentration  of  holdings  (model  1),  considering  the
ariables  of  concentration  of  holdings  (models  2--4),  and
onsidering  the  moderating  effect  of  the  concentration  of
oldings  in  the  relationship  between  familial  nature  and
iversiﬁcation  (models  5--7).  In  all  of  these  models,  the
onexistence  of  multicollinearity  between  the  independent
ariables  of  the  models  is  shown  (the  Variance  Inﬂation  Fac-
or,  VIF,  is  lower  than  10).
b
t
oIn  model  1,  the  positive  inﬂuence  of  familial  nature
n  specialization  is  conﬁrmed.  However,  in  including  the
ariables  for  the  concentration  of  holdings  in  the  model
models  2--4),  the  positive  effect  of  concentration  of  hold-
ngs  acquires  a  greater  importance  in  the  adoption  of
pecialization  strategies  than  does  the  family  nature  of
he  group  itself.  Finally,  in  considering  the  moderating
ffect  of  the  concentration  of  holdings  in  the  relationship
etween  familial  nature  and  diversiﬁcation  (models  5--7),
he  results  show  that  familial  nature  and  concentration
f  holdings  favour  specialization  (fulﬁls  H1).  Furthermore,
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Table  5  The  inﬂuence  of  family  control  on  diversiﬁcation  (Herﬁndahl):  Ordinary  Least  Squares.
Diversiﬁcation
(1)
ˇ-coef
(2)
ˇ-coef
(3)
ˇ-coef
(4)
ˇ-coef
(5)
ˇ-coef
(6)
ˇ-coef
(7)
ˇ-coef
FAM −0.063*** −0.048** −1.80* −0.432* −0.172*** −0.275*** −0.198***
(−2.81) (−2.10) (−1.72) (−1.90) (−4.97) (−5.60)  (−2.86)
% 1  STOCK −0.113** −0.288***
(−2.56)  (−5.12)
% 3  STOCK  −0.158*** −0.319***
(−3.47)  (−6.07)
% 5  STOCK  −0.141*** −0.234***
(−3.10)  (−4.37)
% 1  STOCK  *  FAM  0.362***
(4.65)
% 3  STOCK  *  FAM  0.449***
(5.29)
% 5  STOCK  *  FAM  0.269**
(2.43)
LN SIZE  0.064*** 0.061*** 0.058*** 0.058*** 0.065*** 0.065*** 0.063***
(7.85)  (7.32)  (6.73)  (6.67)  (8.00)  (7.71)  (7.09)
LN AGE  0.035** 0.035** 0.036*** 0.038*** 0.036*** 0.043*** 0.044***
(2.54)  (2.57)  (2.65)  (2.71)  (2.76)  (3.22)  (3.14)
DEBT −0.148*** −0.142*** −0.123** −0.120** −0.144*** −0.127** −0.129**
(−2.98)  (−2.88)  (−2.47)  (−2.38)  (−2.94)  (−2.59)  (−2.56)
INTANG −0.397*** −0.418*** −0.425*** −0.425*** −0.467*** −0.523*** −0.490***
(−5.07)  (−5.02)  (−5.05)  (−5.12)  (−6.00)  (−6.02)  (−5.44)
PR-PR YEAR  −1.130*** −1.111*** −1.078*** −1.061*** −1.048*** −1.011*** −1.023***
(−8.37)  (−8.30)  (−8.06)  (−7.92)  (−7.77)  (−7.55)  (−7.65)
INT CAPIT  −0.027*** −0.023*** −0.022*** −0.023*** −0.022*** −0.020*** −0.023***
(−5.36)  (−4.28)  (4.14)  (−4.58)  (−4.31)  (−4.01)  (−4.38)
SCD 0.116*** 0.132*** 0.137*** 0.132*** 0.118*** 0.116*** 0.118***
(3.71)  (4.16)  (4.24)  (4.09)  (3.86)  (3.77)  (3.77)
CONSTANT −0.423*** −0.379*** −0.318*** −0.320*** −0.383*** −0.367*** −0.355***
(−3.72) (−3.26)  (−2.66)  (−2.64)  (−3.37)  (−3.08)  (−2.88)
F-Value 36.83*** 34.98*** 35.87*** 35.20*** 36.71*** 36.76*** 32.96***
R2 0.3600  0.3685  0.3745  0.3716  0.3921  0.4035  0.3828
R2-adjusted  0.3448  0.3524  0.3585  0.3555  0.3755  0.3871  0.3659
N 564  564  564  564  564  564  564
* p < .10.
** p < .05.
*** p < .01.
p
h
i
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vdifferent  behaviour  within  the  collective  of  family  busi-
nesses  is  shown:  those  family  parent  companies  with  more
concentrated  holdings  specialize  less  than  those  with  less
concentrated  holdings.  The  results  are  consistent  regardless
of  the  measure  of  holdings  concentration  used:  capital  in  the
hands  of  the  group’s  main  stockholder  (model  5),  the  three
main  stockholders  (model  6),  and/or  the  ﬁve  main  stock-
holders  (model  7).  The  existence  of  a  moderating  effect  of
the  concentration  of  holdings  on  the  relationship  between
specialization  and  familial  nature  is  conﬁrmed  (i.e.,  it  fulﬁls
H2),  showing  that  family  control  favours  the  specialization
of  activities  in  a  business  group  (Anderson  and  Reeb,  2003;
Gomez-Mejia  et  al.,  2010).
r
tIn  conclusion,  the  size  of  the  company  and  the  partici-
ation  of  the  company  in  merger-and-acquisition  processes
ave  a  negative  relationship  with  the  strategy  of  special-
zation  (results  similar  to  those  obtained  by  Anderson  and
eeb  (2003),  Gomez-Mejia  et  al.  (2010)  and  Miller  et  al.
2010)).  The  variables  from  the  models  explain  between  35
nd  53%  (approximately)  of  the  variability  of  the  model,  cor-
ectly  classifying  approximately  85.6%  of  the  cases.  All  of  the
egressions  pass  the  Hosmer--Lemeshow  test,  conﬁrming  the
alidity  of  the  models.Tables  5  and  6  show  the  results  corresponding  to  the
egressions  of  OLS  and  the  two-step  Heckman  method  for
he  corrected  Herﬁndahl  index.  In  the  two-step  Heckman
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Table  6  The  inﬂuence  of  family  control  on  diversiﬁcation  (Herﬁndahl):  two-step  Heckman.
Diversiﬁcation  Heckman  (second  stage)
(1)
ˇ-coef
(2)
ˇ-coef
(3)
ˇ-coef
(4)
ˇ-coef
(5)
ˇ-coef
(6)
ˇ-coef
(7)
ˇ-coef
FAM  −0.024  −0.001  0.006  −0.004  −0.182*** −0.326*** −0.265**
(−0.82) (−0.01) (0.21)  (−0.12)  (−3.77)  (−4.58)  (−2.20)
% 1  STOCK −0.131** −0.363***
(−2.18) (−4.78)
% 3  STOCK  −0.166*** −0.404***
(2.62)  (−5.24)
% 5  STOCK  −0.115** −0.288**
(−2.05)  (−1.98)
% 1  STOCK  *  FAM  0.552***
(−4.75)
% 3  STOCK  *  FAM  0.667***
(5.14)
% 5  STOCK  *  FAM  0.467**
(2.40)
div −0.225*** −0.303*** −0.296*** −0.283*** −0.293*** −0.287*** −0.265***
(−2.77)  (−3.24)  (3.10)  (−3.07)  (−3.30)  (−3.26)  (−2.94)
fam −0.092* −0.090* −0.097* −0.100  −0.037  −0.032  −0.061
(−1.87) (−1.65)  (−1.80)  (−1.83)  (−0.77)  (−0.67)  (−1.26)
LN SIZE  −0.019  −0.027  −0.026  −0.022  −0.032  −0.028  −0.019
(−0.72) (−1.04)  (−1.06)  (−0.92)  (−1.28)  (−1.15)  (−0.77)
LN AGE  0.067*** 0.067*** 0.068*** 0.070*** 0.065*** 0.075*** 0.079***
(3.73)  (3.80)  (3.62)  (3.62)  (3.79)  (4.43)  (4.49)
DEBT 0.125  0.131  0.131  0.124  0.078  0.058  0.058
(1.36) (1.45)  (1.38)  (1.32)  (0.89)  (0.67)  (0.66)
INTANG −1.388*** −1.319*** −1.241*** −0.125*** −1.268*** −1.159*** −1.208***
(−4.44)  (−4.25)  (−4.20)  (−4.19)  (−4.23)  (−3.88)  (−3.94)
PR-PR YEAR  −1.376*** −1.314*** −1.293*** −1.312*** −1.266*** −1.267*** −1.293***
(−8.00)  (−7.65)  (−7.21)  (−7.10)  (−7.55)  (−7.68)  (−7.59)
INT CAPIT −0.013  −0.009  −0.009  −0.012  −0.003  −0.004  −0.010
(−1.55) (−1.09)  (−1.17)  (−1.46)  (−0.37)  (−0.52)  (−1.29)
SCD 0.084** 0.106*** 0.106*** 0.096*** 0.093*** 0.094*** 0.086**
(2.37)  (2.89)  (2.92)  (2.66)  (2.62)  (2.69)  (2.43)
CONSTANT 0.529* 0.636** 0.668** 0.616** 0.716*** 0.698*** 0.599**
(1.90)  (2.31)  (2.41)  (2.30)  (2.69)  (2.68)  (2.26)
F-Value 10.85*** 10.83*** 12.38*** 11.19*** 12.26*** 12.92*** 11.43***
R2 0.3517  0.3669  0.3734  0.361  0.4115  0.4243  0.3946
R2-adjusted  0.3193  0.330  0.3398  0.330  0.3780  0.3915  0.3601
N 316  316  316  316  316  316  316
* p < .10.
** p < .05.
m
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g*** p < .01.
odel,  the  results  of  the  second  step  are  presented  along
ith  the  Mills  Lambda  values;  this  is  done  both  for  possi-
le  selection  bias  due  to  diversiﬁcation  (div)  and  for  the
ndogeneity  of  family  control  (fam).15
First,  the  conclusions  derived  from  the  OLS  regressions
see  Table  5)  coincide  with  those  obtained  when  employing
15 It was decided not to present the Probit model from the ﬁrst step
f the Heckman model because the results obtained are analogous
o the results of the Logit model presented in Table 4.
o
c
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h
t
o
tinary  logistic  regression  (see  Table  4).  The  familial  nature
f  the  company  reduces  the  level  of  diversiﬁcation  of  the
roup,  with  a  positive  moderating  effect  of  concentration
f  holdings  on  the  inﬂuence  of  familial  nature  on  diversiﬁ-
ation.  In  the  family  group,  a  greater  proportion  of  capital
n  the  hands  of  the  main,  three  main,  and  ﬁve  main  stock-
olders  increases  the  level  of  diversiﬁcation.However,  there  may  exist  a  possible  selection  bias  for
wo  reasons:  (1)  one  ﬁrst  decides  whether  to  specialize
r  diversify;  and  (2)  later  on,  the  company  adopts  a  par-
icular  level  of  diversiﬁcation.  Thus,  Table  6  shows  the
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two-stage  Heckman  model,  also  taking  into  account  the
possible  endogenous  nature  of  family  ownership  and  thus
guaranteeing  the  robustness  of  the  results  obtained  pre-
viously.  The  ﬁrst  relevant  ﬁnding  is  that  the  Mills  Lambda
corresponding  to  diversiﬁcation  (div)  is  signiﬁcant,  indi-
cating  the  existence  of  bias  and  justifying  the  use  of  the
Heckman  model.  The  Mills  Lambda  corresponding  to  familial
nature  (fam)  is  not  signiﬁcant  (in  models  1--3,  their  signif-
icance  is  weak)  and  therefore  the  familial  nature  group  is
not  affected  by  problems  of  endogeneity.
Model  1  shows  that  familial  nature  does  not  initially  inﬂu-
ence  the  level  of  the  group’s  diversiﬁcation,  a  result  that
is  maintained  upon  introducing  the  variables  corresponding
to  concentration  of  holdings  (models  2--4).  If  one  consid-
ers  the  moderating  effect  of  the  concentration  of  holdings
(models  5--7),  family  groups  opt  for  lower  levels  of  diversi-
ﬁcation  (i.e.,  H1  is  fulﬁlled),  also  verifying  that  the  greater
the  concentration  of  holdings  in  the  family  group  (in  the
three  variables  analysed),  the  greater  the  levels  of  diver-
siﬁcation  (i.e.,  H2  is  fulﬁlled).  In  other  words,  there  is  a
positive  moderating  effect  of  concentration  of  holdings  on
the  inﬂuence  of  familial  nature  on  diversiﬁcation.  These
results  coincide  with  those  obtained  previously  in  Table  5
and  are  analogous  to  those  shown  in  Table  4,  which  showed
a  negative  moderating  effect  of  familial  nature  on  special-
ization.  With  respect  to  the  control  variables,  the  age  of
the  listed  parent  company  and  its  participation  in  merger-
and-acquisition  processes  increases  the  diversiﬁcation  of  the
business  group.  Meanwhile,  greater  investment  in  intangible
assets  and  greater  differences  between  the  economic  proﬁt-
ability  of  the  parent  company  and  the  economic  proﬁtability
for  the  year  reduce  the  level  of  diversiﬁcation.  In  short,  the
hypotheses  established  in  the  study  are  fulﬁlled  regardless
of  the  methodology  utilized  (binary  logistic  regression,  OLS,
and  two-step  Heckman),  and  the  robustness  of  the  results
obtained  is  guaranteed.
In  conclusion,  the  results  of  the  econometric  models  show
that  familial  nature  favours  the  adoption  of  specialization
strategies,  presenting  lower  levels  of  diversiﬁcation  than  for
non-family  groups16;  the  concentration  of  holdings  existing
in  the  family  group  has  a  relevant  impact.  The  participation
of  the  family  in  stockholding,  management,  and  direction
of  the  parent  company  reduces  the  principal-agent  agency
problem  (Fama  and  Jensen,  1983),  thus  reducing  the  level
of  diversiﬁcation  compared  to  those  groups  in  which  the
concentration  of  holdings  is  lower  and  executives  possess
greater  decision-making  power  (Goranova  et  al.,  2007).  As
proposed  by  Gomez-Mejia  et  al.  (2007,  2010,  2011), diver-
siﬁcation  can  damage  socio-emotional  wealth  in  bringing
with  it  the  need  for  new  resources  (human,  ﬁnancial,  and
material),  thus  leading  to  hiring  personnel  and  agents  from
outside  the  family  and  reducing  family  independence.  Diver-
siﬁcation  can  also  require  skills,  knowledge,  and  intangibles
that  the  family  lacks  (Schulze  et  al.,  2002;  Fernández  and
Nieto,  2006),  leading  to  lower  levels  of  diversiﬁcation.
16 It is worth noting that the authors conducted the same study
using the Entropy index as a measure of the degree of diversiﬁcation
(Jacquemin and Berry, 1979; Palepu, 1985) and arrived at the same
conclusions as those derived from Table 5.
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However,  the  existence  of  a  positive  moderating  effect
f  the  concentration  of  holdings  on  the  inﬂuence  of  famil-
al  nature  on  diversiﬁcation  is  shown,  given  that  a  greater
oncentration  of  holdings  in  the  family  group  favours  diver-
iﬁcation.  When  the  degree  of  concentration  of  holdings
s  large  (and  thus  the  risk  tolerated  by  the  company  is
lso  large),  the  family  will  opt  for  a  higher  level  of  diver-
iﬁcation  both  to  reduce  family  and  business  risk  and  to
uarantee  the  survival  of  the  business  group,  a  constitu-
ive  element  of  socio-emotional  wealth.  This  fact  can  create
n  agency  problem  between  the  family  and  minority  stock-
olders  (Morck,  2005),  in  which  case  diversiﬁcation  may
e  more  responsive  to  the  majority  stockholder’s  inter-
sts  than  to  the  search  for  synergies  among  the  various
usinesses  and  companies  that  form  part  of  the  family  hold-
ngs.  Opportunism  and  expropriation  of  minority  stockholder
ssets  will  be  more  likely  when  there  is  a  signiﬁcant  diver-
ence  between  cash-ﬂow  rights  and  the  voting  rights  of  the
tockholder--ﬁnal  owner  (Shleifer  and  Vishny,  1997).  This  sit-
ation  is  not  very  common  among  the  set  of  Spanish  family
ompanies  (Aguiar  and  Santana,  2008)  as  it  is  among  the
amily  companies  of  the  sample  studied  (see  Table  2).
The  results  coincide  not  only  with  those  obtained  by
un˜oz-Bullón  and  Sánchez-Bueno  (2011)  for  a  sample  of
ompanies  from  countries  from  the  European  Union  with
hich  Spain  shares  institutional  framework  aspects  but  also
ith  those  from  the  study  by  Chen  and  Yu  (2011)  for  Taiwan,
 country  characterized  by  a weak  institutional  framework.
owever,  the  lower  level  of  diversiﬁcation  of  family  groups
nd  the  positive  inﬂuence  of  the  concentration  of  fam-
ly  ownership  on  diversiﬁcation  also  appear  in  the  United
tates  (Anderson  and  Reeb,  2003;  Gomez-Mejia  et  al.,  2010;
iller  et  al.,  2010).  It  appears  that  the  effect  of  family
ontrol  on  diversiﬁcation  is  retained  in  various  contexts,
ncluding  institutional  settings  with  greater  protection  of
tockholders  in  which  conﬂict  between  majority  and  minor-
ty  stockholders  is  less  relevant  (Peng,  2003).  However,  one
ust  remember  that  this  study  uses  the  business  group----not
he  business  itself----as its  unit  of  analysis,  and  it  does  not
nclude  any  institutional  variables  in  the  models.
That  notwithstanding,  in  those  cases  in  which  the  owner-
hip  of  the  business  group  is  almost  entirely  controlled  by
amily  members,  the  greater  degree  of  diversiﬁcation  could
ot  be  explained  by  ‘‘tunnelling’’  practices  but  instead  by
he  search  for  the  preservation  of  socio-emotional  wealth
ver  the  long  term  by  reducing  business  and  family  risk
hrough  diversiﬁcation  (Gomez-Mejia  et  al.,  2010).
onclusions
he  study  is  a  new  contribution  to  understanding  the  rela-
ionship  between  structure  of  ownership  and  diversiﬁcation
rom  the  perspective  of  agency  theory,  complemented  by
he  concept  of  socio-emotional  wealth.  This  study  analyses
he  inﬂuence  of  familial  nature  as  a  determinant  of  diver-
iﬁcation  in  large  business  groups  in  Spain  whose  parent
ompanies  are  listed  on  the  stock  exchange,  along  with  the
oderating  effect  of  the  concentration  of  holdings  in  family
usinesses  with  respect  to  level  of  diversiﬁcation.
The  results  conﬁrm  the  major  presence  of  family
roups  within  Spanish  stock  markets.  With  respect  to  the
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elationship  between  ownership  structure  and  level  of  diver-
iﬁcation,  the  study  shows  how  the  familial  nature  of  a
usiness  group  reduces  the  level  of  diversiﬁcation,  with  a
ositive  inﬂuence  on  specialization  of  activities;  however,
oncentration  of  holdings  plays  an  important  role.  One  can
ote  the  moderating  effect  of  the  concentration  of  holdings
hat  is  manifested  in  a  greater  preference  for  diversiﬁca-
ion  in  those  family  groups  that  have  a  higher  degree  of
oncentration  of  holdings.
The  academic  implications  of  this  research  are  varied.
irst,  the  use  of  the  business  group  as  the  unit  of  analysis
f  the  level  of  diversiﬁcation  allows  for  measures  of  diver-
iﬁcation  to  more  adequately  reﬂect  the  corporate  strategy
f  the  parent  company  and  facilitates  the  identiﬁcation  of
trategies  adopted  by  family  agents.  In  Spain,  groups  of  fam-
ly  companies  are  quite  common  (Aguiar  and  Santana,  2008),
lthough  they  have  not  been  sufﬁciently  analysed  from
he  family-business  perspective.  Families  that  are  inclined
o  use  business  holdings  structures  make  decisions  about
ompanies  together  and  not  individually,  evaluating  the  con-
equences  of  those  decisions  on  the  group  in  which  they  have
nvested  their  assets.  For  the  family,  the  business  group  can
e  established  as  a  substitute  for  the  market,  principally
n  those  countries  characterized  by  weak  institutions  and
oorly  developed  civil  law  and  markets,  such  that  the  busi-
ess  group  can  allow  the  family  to  satisfy  its  need  to  obtain
nancing  and  to  overcome  the  inefﬁciencies  of  the  market
Guillén,  2000).  For  this  reason,  if  one  wishes  to  understand
nd  better  analyse  the  behaviour  of  family  agents  and  the
trategies  that  they  use,  one  should  analyse  the  group  of
ompanies  and  not  simply  the  parent  company  because  to  do
therwise  would  be  to  ignore  a  large  portion  of  the  activities
f  business  holdings.
Second,  and  unlike  previous  research  focused  on  the  rela-
ionship  between  stockholder  spread  and  diversiﬁcation,
his  study  contributes  new  evidence  for  the  case  of  Spain
ith  respect  to  the  effect  of  the  familial  nature  of  a control-
ing  shareholder  on  diversiﬁcation  strategies.  Finally,  this
tudy  adds  new  ﬁndings  for  Spain,  a  country  whose  legal  sys-
em  is  based  on  civil  law  and  that  has  a  weaker  institutional
ramework  and  regulatory  structure  (in  terms  of  protec-
ion  for  minority  stockholders)  compared  to  English-speaking
ountries.  In  this  context,  where  the  concentration  of  hold-
ngs  is  greater,  it  is  likely  that  conﬂicts  may  arise  between
ajority  stockholders  (i.e.,  families)  and  minority  stock-
olders  when  diversiﬁcation  strategies  are  implemented
hat  are  more  responsive  to  the  controlling  shareholder’s
eeds  than  to  the  search  for  synergies  among  the  businesses
nd/or  companies  that  form  part  of  the  holding  structure.
cademic  and  practical  implications
his  study  has  implications  not  only  for  academics  but  also
or  business  practice  in  general  and  in  the  area  of  family
usiness  in  particular.  The  results  show  that  families  par-
icipate  signiﬁcantly  in  stock  markets,  a  fact  that  can  be
valuated  by  market  investors  given  that  the  familial  nature
f  the  group  in  which  they  participate  has  a  dual  effect  on
iversiﬁcation  strategies  and  affects  business  outcomes.
Standing  alone,  the  familial  nature  of  a  business  can
esult  in  its  avoidance  of  investment  and  activities  within
a
b
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he  business  group  that  can  harm  minority  stockholders,  as
an  occur  in  enterprises  in  which  ownership  is  spread  out
nd  managerial  discretion  is  greater.  Likewise,  a  family’s
reservation  of  socio-emotional  wealth  can  lead  to  a  renun-
iation  of  new  activities  that  could  endanger  the  business
roup’s  survival.  Both  aspects  would  be  evaluated  posi-
ively  in  stock  markets,  creating  a  positive  image  of  both
he  business  group  and  the  family.  However,  an  elevated
oncentration  of  holdings  in  a  family  business  can  lead  to
onﬂicts  between  majority  and  minority  stockholders,  lead-
ng  to  an  effort  to  satisfy  the  family’s  needs  to  the  detriment
f  the  minority  stockholders  (placement  of  unqualiﬁed  fam-
ly  members,  inefﬁcient  investments,  expropriation  of  the
ealth  of  minority  stockholders,  etc.),  such  that  the  fam-
ly  group  transmits  a  negative  public  image.  In addition,  the
esire  to  maintain  socio-emotional  wealth  can  lead  to  the
ejection  of  new  projects  and/or  investments  that  would
ead  to  improved  group  results.
In light  of  the  above  observations,  this  study  also  makes
ontributions  relevant  to  family  group  executives.  When
anaging  a  business,  the  family  must  incorporate  inde-
endent  external  executives  that  will  help  them  in  the
iversiﬁcation  process  though  the  selection  of  projects  and
he  realization  of  new  activities  that  provide  a  legitimate
ontribution  to  value  creation  for  the  family  group,  not  as  a
onsequence  of  opportunistic  behaviour.  The  establishment
f  a  code  or  set  of  guidelines  in  the  family  protocol  that
void  opportunistic  behaviours  on  the  part  of  the  family  will
revent  investments  that  are  harmful  to  the  survival  of  the
amily  business.  In  both  cases,  this  will  contribute  not  only
o  the  creation  of  a  brand  image  for  both  the  business  group
nd  the  family  but  also  to  obtaining  the  trust  of  the  market.
imitations  and  future  lines  of  investigation
bviously,  this  study  has  a  series  of  limitations  that  could
ive  rise  to  future  lines  of  investigation.  Given  that  this  study
resents  the  variable  for  specialization  and  the  corrected
erﬁndahl  index,  it  would  be  worth  using  other  measures
f  diversiﬁcation  such  as  indices  of  entropy  of  related
nd  non-related  diversiﬁcation  (Jacquemin  and  Berry,  1979;
alepu,  1985).  An  in-depth  study  of  types  of  diversiﬁcation
related  and  non-related)  would  provide  a  better  view  of
he  global  strategy  of  business  groups  and  of  the  possible
ifferences  between  family  groups  and  non-family  groups.
amily  groups  will  adopt  strategies  that  allow  them  to  opti-
ize  their  performance  while  maintaining  socio-emotional
ealth  (Gomez-Mejia  et  al.,  2010;  Berrone  et  al.,  2012).  In
he  literature,  one  can  see  family  businesses’  preference  for
dopting  strategies  of  related  diversiﬁcation  (Kang,  1999;
ru  and  Crespi,  2006;  Gomez-Mejia  et  al.,  2010),  given  that
on-related  diversiﬁcation  results  in  higher  costs,  greater
ncertainty,  and  a  greater  need  for  ﬁnancial  resources.
amily  businesses  are  more  likely  to  opt  for  this  growth
trategy  to  avoid  the  loss  of  family  control  (Miller  and  Le
reton-Miller,  2009) and  the  consequent  harm  to  their  socio-
motional  wealth.  Given  the  above,  a  line  of  research  could
rise  to  provide  a  deeper  exploration  of  the  relationship
etween  family  control  and  type  of  diversiﬁcation.
One  also  sees  the  importance  of  analysing  the  nature
f  the  non-family  ﬁnal  owner,  or  whether  there  has  been
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a  change  in  the  nature  of  the  ﬁnal  owner.  One  could  distin-
guish  among  various  groups----family,  foreigners,  a  controlling
ﬁnancial  institution,  investment  funds,  and  wide  dispersion
in  ownership----and  analyse  whether  family  groups  are  dif-
ferentiated  from  all  non-family  groups  or  whether  the  two
could  share  certain  characteristics.
In  future  research,  it  will  be  necessary  to  conduct  a  fur-
ther  exploration  of  the  relationship  between  measures  of
performance  and  productivity  according  to  ownership  struc-
ture  and  diversiﬁcation  strategy,  looking  at  the  nature  of
the  ﬁnal  owner,  whether  it  is  a  family  business  or  a  non-
family  owner.  The  existing  studies  are  very  few  (Kang,  1999;
Anderson  and  Reeb,  2003;  Gomez-Mejia  et  al.,  2010) and
more  research  is  needed.
Another  limitation  of  this  study  is  that  its  results  are
applicable  to  large  business  groups  whose  parent  companies
are  listed  on  the  market,  and  it  cannot  be  generalized  to
those  groups  or  family  companies  that  are  not  listed  and/or
that  are  smaller  in  size.  Thus,  another  line  of  research  would
explore  what  happens  to  smaller  enterprises  and  business
groups  with  a  higher  degree  of  concentration  of  holdings
and  the  possible  differences  between  family  and  non-family
companies  and  groups.
It would  be  interesting  to  analyse  the  inﬂuence  of  the
presence  of  the  founder  and/or  the  current  generation  in  the
family  group  upon  the  adoption  of  diversiﬁcation  strategies
or  specialization.  As  noted  by  Gomez-Mejia  et  al.  (2007), the
desire  to  preserve  socio-emotional  wealth  varies  according
the  generation  directing  the  company:  if  the  founder  directs
the  company,  the  desire  to  preserve  socio-emotional  wealth
will  be  greater  than  in  those  companies  whose  ownership
is  spread  among  family  members  of  later  generations,  such
as  children  and  groups  of  cousins.  Thus,  depending  on  the
spread  of  family  ownership  to  children  and  groups  of  cousins,
one  could  foresee  an  increase  in  the  adoption  of  diversi-
ﬁcation  strategies  compared  to  those  groups  in  which  the
founder  is  present.  Those  latter  groups  will  be  more  reluc-
tant  to  adopt  diversiﬁcation  strategies  that  could  endanger
their  survival.
Finally,  it  would  be  interesting  to  conduct  a  more  detailed
analysis  of  the  ownership  structure  of  family  groups,  study-
ing  the  presence  of  other  stockholders  participating  in  the
family  group  with  important  participation  in  capital,  with
the  aim  of  analysing  their  inﬂuence  on  strategic  decision
making  (Jara-Bertin  et  al.,  2008;  Sacristán-Navarro  et  al.,
2011)  that  affects  both  the  degree  of  diversiﬁcation  and
company  performance.  The  characteristics  of  the  board  of
directors  and  company  executives,  the  presence  of  external
independent  executives,  and  the  greater  or  lesser  presence
of  family  member  on  boards  (Minichilli  et  al.,  2010)  are  fac-
tors  that  could  affect  diversiﬁcation  strategies,  all  of  which
would  need  to  be  controlled  in  future  studies.
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nnex I.
Table  6  Example  of  differences  in  the  number  of  activi-
ties to  be  considered  according  to  the  analysis  of  the  listed
parent company  or  business  group  (2005).
CNAE  93
Rev.1  Codes
(parent
company)
Number  of
ﬁrms  in
business
group
CNAE  93
Rev.  1  Codes
(business
group)
Altadis  1600,  5135 32  1600,  2953,
5117,  5135,
5147,  5170,
5211,  5226,
5262,  6024,
6311,  6321,
7011,  7220,
7414,  7415,
7484,  9261
Amper  S.A.  6420,  7310  10  3220,  6420,
6712,  7220,
7415,  7310,
7420
Campofrío  1513  8  0130,  1513,
4010,  7134,
7484
Cartemar  7011  9  0125,  5510,
7011,  7414
Source:  Author.
If  only  the  parent  company  is  considered,  the  head  com-
any  of  a  business  group  and  the  number  of  activities  used
o  estimate  the  level  of  diversiﬁcation  is  much  smaller.  If
ne  considers  the  business  group,  the  number  of  activities
ncreases  notably,  providing  a better  perspective  on  global
trategy  and  on  the  degree  of  the  relationships  among  the
arious  activities.
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